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COMPLEMENTARITY AS POLITICS
Laura Clarke*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The creation and consolidation of an international
human rights regime following the end of World War II was a
triumph1 not least in the apparent bypassing of state sovereignty
as an overriding principle of international relations. However,
underwriting this new regime is the necessary compromise
between the supremacy of the nation state and internationalism
that gives momentum to the human rights movement. The
international rights regime is predicated on this highly sensitive
and volatile balance.2 The International Criminal Court (ICC)
has made the compromise explicit through codification of the
complementarity principle,
balancing
domestic
and
international dimensions of norm enforcement. 3 Article 17 of
the Rome Statute triggers the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction
in situations where the State is deemed “unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” 4 The
purpose of complementarity is “to preserve the power of the
ICC over irresponsible states that refuse to prosecute nationals
who commit heinous international crimes, but balances that
supranational power against the sovereign right of states to
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1
HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 115 (3d ed. 2008); see Jack Donnelly,
International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT’L ORG. 599, 614–
15 (1986) (discussing the contemporary international human rights regime
that developed following World War II).
2
See JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE
PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 17 (2008) (discussing the proper balance
between ensuring effective prosecution of international crimes and
safeguarding state sovereignty); see also Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The
Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 870 (2002) (noting
the tension between state sovereignty and international justice).
3
El Zeidy, supra note 2 (explaining the balance between national
and international criminal justice).
4
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, ¶ 1, Jul.
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
38
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prosecute their own nationals without external interference.”5
The ICC’s complementarity doctrine is an attempt to pacify
concerns that the Court could exercise unchecked dominance
over States parties and be manipulated as a political weapon
against opponents.6
While the history of the complementarity principle
predates the creation of the ICC, the Court’s formation has
shone a spotlight on the doctrine’s theory and practice. The
implications of complementarity’s practical application are of
particular concern, given that States parties “transfer of formal
authority has failed to produce meaningful criteria dictating
how exactly the ICC should exercise its authority.” 7 As a
ground-breaking institution, the ICC acts with little
interference in venturing outside the provisions established in
the Rome Statute.8
It has become increasing urgent to consider the ICC’s
approach to complementarity because of the Court’s
intervention in the conflict between the government of Uganda
and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA, formed
largely as a response to the rule of President Yoweri
Museveni, 9 has waged war against the government since the
mid-1980s.10 The group is led by Joseph Kony of the northern
Acholi tribe and owes its origins largely to the politicalreligious strategy of the earlier rebel Holy Spirit Movement
(HSM).11 With the conflict now in its third decade, the LRA’s
5

Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic
Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 26–27 (2001) (emphasis added).
6
See El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 890 (describing the institutional
tensions between the ICC and state actors); see also Christine Bjork &
Juanita Goebertus, Note from the Field, Complementarity in Action: The
Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya, 14
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 205, 213 (2011) (discussing the implications
of complementarity and noting that the ICC can only contribute indirectly
by encouraging state actors to take action).
7
Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda,
Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VIR. J. INT’L L.
107, 110 (2009) (arguing that the Uganda crisis has revealed issues
regarding complementarity).
8
See id. (noting that the Rome Statute leaves unanswered questions
about how far states should be required to go to pursue criminal justice).
9
There remains substantial debate about the specific goals of the
LRA. See TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY 43 (2006) (explaining the
origins of the LRA).
10
Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Amnesty and International Law: The
Case of the Lord’s Resistance Army Insurgents in Northern Uganda, 5 AFR.
J. ON CONFLICT RESOL. 33, 34 (2005) (explaining that the LRA has persisted
against the Ugandan government since the mid-1980’s).
11
See Ledio Cakaj, The Lord’s Resistance Army of Today, THE
ENOUGH
PROJECT,
Nov.
2010,
2–3,
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/lra_today.pdf.

40 ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 2, No. 2
& COMPARATIVE LAW

method of perpetuating its crusade through the use of child
soldiers has become notorious. 12 As a consequence, the
international narrative is an oversimplification of the complex
reality. It relies on the image of “a messianic leader, Joseph
Kony, and a rag tag of adult rebels” waging a failing religious
crusade against the Ugandan regime.13 Following a number of
unsuccessful military efforts against the rebel group and its
ratification of the Rome Statute, the Ugandan government
chose to refer the situation to the ICC.14 This resulted in the
release of arrest warrants for Kony and four of his
commanders in July 2005.15 Since the ICC’s decision to pursue
the case, people within Uganda have been questioning the
intervention’s implications for a peaceful resolution to the
conflict. 16 With the LRA commanders insisting that the
warrants be revoked before they consider future peace
negotiations, citizens and leaders have been turning to
alternative justice mechanisms (AJMs) as viable substitutes for
international prosecutions. 17 In the face of growing demands
for domestic peace and reconciliation, the Museveni
administration has taken up the case of deferral, seeking
withdrawal of the ICC’s arrest warrants.18
The crisis in Uganda gives a new impetus to analyze
the ICC’s complementarity doctrine that questions both the
role of the Court and its relationship with domestic
jurisdictions. However, a widespread failure to examine the
principle within its historical context restricts the Court’s
ability to look externally for supervision and precedents. This
12

More than 20,000 abductions are believed to have been carried
out by the LRA and eighty percent of its forces are now thought to consist
of child abductees. See Alhagi Marong, Unlocking the Mysteriousness of
Complementarity: In Search of a Forum Conveniens for Trial of the Leaders
of the Lord’s Resistance Army, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 67, 73 (2011)
(stating that the LRA has enlisted children in armed conflict); see also H.
Abigail Moy, Recent Development, The International Criminal Court’s
Arrest Warrants and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army: Renewing the
Debate over Amnesty and Complementarity, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267,
268 (2006) (discussing the extent of the abuse endured by child abductees
who are used as laborers, sex slaves, and human shields).
13
ERROL P. MENDES, PEACE AND JUSTICE AT THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COURT OF LAST RESORT 87 (2010).
14
Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 112–113.
15
Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 112–113.
16
MENDES, supra note 13, at 102.
17
See ALLEN, supra at note 9 (providing a comprehensive account
of Ugandan requests for deferral and the use of AJMs); see also Erin K.
Baines, The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and
Reconciliation in Northern Uganda, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 91,
(2007).
18
See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 108; see also Linda M. Keller,
Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and
Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 217
(2008) (explaining that Uganda would agree to petition the ICC to withdraw
the arrest warrants if the LRA agreed to alternative measures of justice).
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article will fill the analytical chasm of current analyses. Part II
will consider complementarity through the lens of its historical
application. It will trace evolution of the principle from World
War I through to creation of the ICC’s Rome Statute. Part III
will examine complementarity as a political concept,
introducing the Two-Level Model of Political Responsiveness
as a new understanding of the doctrine. Finally, Part IV will
consider the need for a reintroduction of a political aspect to
the enactment of complementarity. It will conclude that the
ICC’s attempt to codify complementarity as a legal doctrine
has failed and that victims’ interests are best served by an
approach that is located in contextual, political understanding.
Tensions, such as those exhibited in the Ugandan crisis, are a
product the failure to recognize complementarity as a
historically-contextual, politically-saturated concept.
I.

TOWARDS A HISTORY OF COMPLEMENTARITY

Complementarity as a formal legal doctrine did not
exist prior to the Rome Statute. 19 It is through attempts to
negotiate a compromise between domestic and international
war crimes prosecutions that complementarity, as a codified
concept, has come to fruition. 20 An examination of State
prosecutorial practice following armed conflict offers a new
framework within which the ICC’s approach can be
scrutinized. That analysis also contradicts traditional academic
acceptance of complementarity as a legal doctrine, 21 by
placing the concept in its historical context.
a. World War I and the Leipzig Trials

19

See El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 890–91 (examining the history of
complementarity and its importance in the Rome Statute).
20
See id. at 870 (noting that “complementarity” is not a new
concept).
21
See MENDES, supra note 13, at 132 (examining the ICC’s
difficult role in balancing peace and justice); see also William W. BurkeWhite, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and
National Courts in the Rome System of Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 56
(2008) (examining prosecutorial practice after the Rome Statute); see also
Federica Gioia, State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and ‘Modern’ International
Law: The Principle of Complementarity in the International Criminal Court,
19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1095, 1101 (2006) (contrasting complementarity and
primacy to determine which should be used going forward); see also
Gregory S. Gordon, Complementarity and Alternative Justice, 88 OR. L.
REV. 621, 623 (2009) (raising the question of whether meaningful, local
justice is considered under complementarity); see also Newton, supra note 5,
at 27 (noting that the complementarity principle would be important to how
the ICC acts vis-a-vis States); see also El Zeidy, supra note 2 (examining
the problems raised by the complementarity principle that are faced by the
drafters of the Rome Statute).
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World War I was a landmark for state recognition of
international law’s regulatory potential. 22 It represented “the
first major combat in which all sides expended significant
effort to document legal wrongs of the others during the
waging of battle.” 23 The Allies’ decision to pursue
international prosecutions for German aggression may be
viewed as a logical step, connecting this new understanding of
law as a weapon against normative violations with a fear of
war’s increasingly destructive scale. The overriding goal was
“to establish a new precedent in international law . . . the
principle that national leaders might be held criminally
responsible for their actions, especially for waging a war of
aggression . . . the principle that national leaders might be held
criminally responsible for their actions, especially for waging a
war of aggression.”24 The belief that international prosecutions
would deter future aggression, a consideration repeated at the
time of the Nuremberg trials, provided substantial momentum
for the Allies in deciding how to proceed in the formation of
the post-World War I order.25
However, discussions about how to approach the quest
for justice were not characterized by unanimous advocacy for
international tribunals.26 The Paris Peace Conference of 1919
was plagued by political concerns regarding the consequences
of implementing untested legal frameworks with an
unprecedented international jurisdiction. 27 The final report of
22

See El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 871 (stating that after World War I
effort was made to try war criminals in Allied Tribunals).
23
RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE & ADAM M. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS: THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AT
HOME AND ABROAD 19 (1st ed., 2009).
24
See JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS
AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD
WAR 80 (1st ed. 1982) (describing British Prime Minister Lloyd Geroge’s
position that the Kaiser should be held individually responsible); see also 1
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD WAR I: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
MILITARY HISTORY A-D (Spencer C. Tucker & Priscilla Roberts eds., 2005)
(noting that the nature of World War I spurred action to prevent such
atrocities from repeating themselves).
25
See U.S. Secretary-General, Historical Survey of the Question of
International Criminal Jurisdiction: Memorandum Submitted by the
Secretary-General, p. 18 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.1 (1949).at 2
(recognizing the common goals between the Nuremburg trials and the
proposed war tribunals after World War I); see also AMOS YODOR,
EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES SYSTEM 121 (2d ed. 1993) (pointing out
that the lofty goal of the League of Nations was to prevent wars of
aggression).
26
See Jackson Maogoto, Early Efforts to Establish an International
Criminal Court, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 3, 14 (Jose Doria et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the disagreement over
the use of war crimes tribunals).
27
See MARK ALAN LEWIS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MOVEMENTS
AGAINST WAR CRIMES, TERRORISM, AND GENOCIDE 1919–1948 161 (2011)
(describing opposition to an international criminal court as late as the mid-
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the Conference recommended “the trial by international courts
of accused persons of the nationalities of the defeated Powers,”
but objections to this broad notion of accountability caused a
substantial narrowing in the provisions ultimately applied. 28
Rather, the Treaty of Versailles’ focus is on the prosecution of
Kaiser Wilhelm II.29 Article 227 outlines the approach taken to
the Kaiser’s accountability, proposing a tribunal at which the
leader would be tried “for a supreme offence against
international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” 30 The
consequence of prosecuting a head of state was a concern for
many of the Allies, particularly the British who “feared that
their head of state, the King, could be exposed to similar
risks.” 31 These political concerns came to fruition in the
drafting of Article 227:
They define the crime of aggression as the supreme
crime against the sanctity of the law of treaties. The
question that arises is what is a “crime against the
sanctity of the law of treaties?” This inherent vagueness
in Article 227 was deliberate and was built into the
Article so that, should the Kaiser ever be brought to trial,
he would be acquitted based on the fact that his
conviction would violate the principles of legality.32
1920s). The United States was particularly vocal in its opposition to
international trials. A memorandum of American objections to the proposals
put forward at the Conference confirms that “the American representatives
believed that the nations should use the machinery at hand, which has been
tried and found competent, with a law and procedure framed and therefore
known in advance, rather than to create an international tribunal with a
criminal jurisdiction for which there is no precedent, precept, practice, or
procedure.” Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal
Jurisdiction – Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General, supra note
25, at 55.
28
Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal
Jurisdiction – Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General, supra note
25, at 2. (detailing how the accountability of Heads of State was limited
after World War I).
29
Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal
Jurisdiction – Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General, supra note
25, at 2 (noting that the main focus of the Treaty of Versailles was on
prosecution of the German Head of State); I–IV ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT 1700 (David Levinson ed., 2002) (discussing the strategy
and outcome of the attempted prosecution of the Kaiser).
30
The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers
and Germany art. 227, June 28, 1919, 1919 U.S.T. 7, 2 Bevans 43
[hereinafter Treaty of Versailles] (stating that the tribunal will consist of
five judges, one from each of the following countries: the U.S., Great
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan).
31
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International Criminal Court in
Historical Context, 99 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 55, 58
(1999).
32
See Bassiouni, supra note 31 (citations omitted) (concluding that
Article 227 was “artfully drafted” by vaguely defining the crime of
aggression).
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The Treaty of Versailles therefore pays little credence to the
visions of the Paris Conference. Instead, it appears to represent
a collision of judicial concerns with political realities. This is
further demonstrated by the provisions relating to the trial of
suspects other than the Kaiser. Article 228 denotes the
envisioned relationship between international tribunals and the
German government and is an early embodiment of the
primacy of international prosecutions for war crimes:
The German Government recogni[z]es the right of the
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military
tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in
violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons
shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid
down by law. . . . The German Government shall hand
over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one
of them as shall so request, all persons accused of
having committed an act in violation of the laws and
customs of war, who are specified either by name or by
the rank, office or employment which they held under
the German authorities.33
The treaty’s international prosecutions failed to take place. 34
The Allied powers were concerned with maintaining a stable
international order and overriding the treaty’s intentions were
“British and French diplomats reporting that the rickety
German government might actually collapse if all of the
suspects were forcibly brought before a war crimes court.” 35
Consequently, “the Allies were shaken and quickly ceded to a
compromise floated by Berlin which suggested trying suspects
in Germany, before a German court.” 36 These subsequent
domestic trials, conducted at Leipzig, were unsuccessful;
convictions were few and the guilty punished with
inappropriately lenient sentences. 37 Despite this failure, the
proceedings at Leipzig were a culmination of vacillating views
on the relationship between domestic and international
prosecutions.38 The politically expedient shift from primacy in
33

Treaty of Versailles, supra note 30, at art. 228,(emphasis added).
See Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 58 (indicating that the views on
prosecution varied); see also Taylor G. Stout, The International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, INT’L JUD. MONITOR (Winter 2011),
http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_winter2011/historic.html
(illustrating that the quixotical war crimes tribunal never crystallized).
35
GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 37.
36
GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 37.
37
WILLIS, supra note 24 (noting that the Allies were disappointed
by the German war crime trials in Lipzig); Theodor Meron, Reflections on
the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L
L. 551, 558 (2006) (noting that twelve officers were tried in Leipzig, only
six of whom were convicted).
38
See Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of
Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321,
34
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the Treaty of Versailles towards complementarity39 represents
an early attempt to negotiate a compromise between the
demands of domestic versus international justice. The political
nature of these decisions, both in terms of power politics and an
appreciation for the domestic political context, is reflected in
the evolution of the complementarity concept from Nuremberg
to Rome.
b. World War II and the Nuremberg Trials
Hailed as laying the groundwork for the international
human rights regime, the Nuremberg trials were a triumph for
legalism. 40 However, to suggest that the debate was
characterized exclusively by advocacy of international trials is
a mistake. Rather, the debate came to represent a conflict
between legalism through the pursuit of international war
crimes trials and a desire for extrajudicial executions. 41 The
Nuremberg discussions were not characterized by indecision
regarding international versus domestic proceedings.42 Yet the
333 (1999) (explaining that Leipzig’s outcome supported the view that
domestic courts of conquered nations would not be able to deliver justice
through domestic prosecutions). This is a point also demonstrated in Allied
handling of the Armenian genocide, in which 600,000 Armenians were
killed in Turkey during World War I. The debate over whether to prosecute
those responsible within the confines of international law was contentious
and again suffered the objections by American representatives. Ultimately,
political considerations again won out: “The debate finally ended, not as a
result of legal resolution, but as a result of changing political needs. The
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, prompted fear among the Allies that
Turkey might suffer a comparable revolution. Subsequently, the Treaty of
Lausanee was negotiated, granting clemency to those responsible for the
atrocities.” Importantly, “this political decision would later haunt the Allies
as they attempted to justify the commencement against the Nazis fro similar
atrocities at the end of the Second World War.” Matthew D. Peter, Note,
The Proposed International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Legal
and Political Debates Regarding Jurisdiction that Threaten the
Establishment of an Effective Court, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 177,
181–82 (1997) (maintaining that the debate over whether to prosecute those
responsible for the Armenian genocide under international law was
controversial and that the U.S. objected to the prosecutions).
39
El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 872–73 (noting that although Article
228 supported the use of international tribunals, there was ultimately an
“agreement to defer to the German courts”).
40
STEINER, supra note 1 (stating that the Nuremburg trials acted as
a liberal accomplishment for national and international human rights);
Gwynne Skinner, Nuremburg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremburg Trials’
Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien Tort
Statute, 71 ALB. L. REV. 321, 326 (2008) (regarding it as well-known that
the Nuremberg trials changed the international human rights scheme).
41
Elizabeth Borgwardt, Re-examining Nuremberg as a New Deal
Institution: Politics, Culture and the Limits of Law in Generating Human
Rights Norms, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 401, 414–15 (2005) (noting that
Roosevelt himself was in favor of summary executions early on).
42
For full discussions of the debates preceding the decision to
pursue international trials at Nuremberg, see generally GARY JONATHAN
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question of whether international trials would be appropriate
and the implication of Allied domestic politics in the decision
represent a significant stage in the historical trajectory of
complementarity as a political concept.
The debate regarding post-World War II Germany was
highly contentious and was played out most completely within
the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 43
Roosevelt was required to decide between two extremes of the
legal spectrum. On the one hand, Secretary of War Henry
Stimson was advocating a post-war accountability based on the
Bill of Rights, and on the other hand, Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Morgenthau was constructing a plan based on the
extrajudicial execution of Nazi leaders and the pastoralization
of Germany. 44 The Morgenthau Plan, supported initially by
Roosevelt,45 was predicated on the idea that “the guilt of such
[Nazi] individuals is so black that they fall outside and go
beyond the scope of any judicial process.”46 Indeed, the use of
summary executions as a means to deal with Nazi leaders also
found widespread support in public opinion. 47 Despite this,
Stimson consistently advocated in favor of legalism.48 Writing
in direct response to the Morgenthau Plan, he stated that
The method of dealing with these and other criminals
requires careful thought and a well-defined procedure.
Such procedure must embody, in my judgment, at least
the rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Rights, namely,
notification to the accused of the charge, the right to be
heard and, within reasonable limits, to call witnesses to
his defen[c]e.49

BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS (2000); see also MARRUS, supra note 49;see generally
Borgwardt, supra note 41.
43
See generally BASS, supra note 42; see also Borgwardt, supra
note 41, at 414–20 (presenting various opinions on how to manage
Germany).
44
Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 414–18 (providing a full account
of Morgenthau’s plan and Stimson’s response); Nir Eisikovits, Transitional
Justice, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 26, 2009),
http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives /win2011/entries/justice-transitional/
(discussing Morgenthau’s plan for summary executions and Stimson’s plan
for fair trials).
45
Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 415.
46
BASS, supra note 42, at 13 (citing ANTHONY EDEN, EDEN WAR
MEMORANDUM, CAB 66/25 (1942)).
47
See BASS, supra note 42, at 147 (commentating that “The British
and American publics would have preferred to shoot the Nazis without
bothering with a trial”).
48
BASS, supra note 42, at 115–157.
49
MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL
1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 27 (Katherine E. Kurzman et al. eds.,
1997).
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Underpinning this debate was the goal of German
denazification – “the re-education and rehabilitation of ordinary
Germans and their leaders.” 50 The use of legalist methods to
deal with the Nazi leaders was seen as fundamental to
preventing the re-emergence of the Party and eliminating any
remaining threads of support from the populace.51
Despite initial support for the Morgenthau Plan, public
disapproval of Germany’s pastoralization forced Roosevelt to
shift his support from the Morgenthau Plan to plans advocating
for legal proceedings. 52 It was, in part, a decision based on
political expedience: “with the presidential election seven
weeks away, an embattled and annoyed Roosevelt withdrew
his support for the Treasury proposal, favo[]ring the ‘middle
road’ of the short-term War Department approach almost by
default.”53 In light of procedural discussions following World
War I, many were concerned that the Morgenthau Plan could
introduce further instability into the post-war international
order.54 The fear was that
the Treasury plan would ensure that Germany remained
‘a festering sore . . . in the heart of Europe, and there
would be installed a chaos which would assuredly end in
war.’ The Post further emphasized that Nazi propaganda
minister Josef Goebbels was already using the story ‘as
a threat to spur Germans to greater resistance against the
Allies.’55
The decision to reject summary executions as a viable solution
and accept international trials was, therefore, both a political
and moral decision. The ultimate choice to predicate the trials
on charges of illegal war, as opposed to the crimes of the
Holocaust,56 lends further credence to this conclusion.
50

ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD 204
(2005) (listing additional debate topics such as “individual accountability,”
“reparations,” and “disarmament”).
51
MARRUS, supra note 49; see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense
Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J.
INT’L L. 529, 539 (2008) (surmising that the act of creating a historical
record through a trial is effective in creating an account for future
generations to be wary of).
52
See BASS, supra note 42, at 168–69.
53
Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 418.
54
Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 418 (indicating how newspaper
coverage of the Morgenthau Plan focused on how it would bring about more
commotion than harmony).
55
Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 418 (citations omitted).
56
MARRUS, supra note 49 (quoting ‘Minutes of the London
Conference for the Preparation of the Trial’ to affirm the point that: “We
have some regrettable circumstances at times in our own country in which
minorities are unfairly treated. We think it is justifiable that we interfere or
attempt to bring retribution to individuals or states only because the
concentration camps and the deportations were in pursuance of a common
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Although Nuremberg certainly represents a triumph for
international legalism, it must be tempered by an awareness of
the role that politics played in determining post-conflict
accountability procedures. 57 Nuremberg was a product of
internationalized domestic values, the demands of Allied
internal politics, and the desire for a stable post-war order. It
was fed by the failure of Leipzig, 58 and gained momentum
from acknowledgement that World War II must represent a
turning point towards international cooperation and
accountability for human rights atrocities.59
c. The International Criminal Tribunals of Yugoslavia and
Rwanda
With the onset of the Cold War, efforts to further the
project of international criminal justice took a backseat. 60
During this period, the “decisive political ingredient was
absent. . . . The result was that progress was stymied and the
desired consensus was beyond reach.” 61 Application of the
Nuremberg principles and new international human rights law
continued in the post-World War II setting “but other than the
brief examples of Nuremberg and Tokyo, [the trials] were all
domestic in nature.”62 With the end of the Cold War, “the rise
of Pax Americana and the ‘end of history’ opened new
possibilities to return to the international notions of justice that
had seemed to permeate, even if ephemerally, in the years after
World War II.”63
Viewed within this context, the creation of the
International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal of
Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994 exemplify the post-Cold War
resurgence of internationalism. The tribunals further represent
the legacy of international criminal law laid out by the

plan or enterprise of making an unjust or illegal war in which we became
involved”).
57
GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23.
58
BASS, supra note 42, at 184–185.
59
Borgwardt, supra note 41 (acknowledging the international
pressure to punish war criminals after World War II).
60
M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five
Years: The Need to Establish A Permanent International Criminal Court,
10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 38–39 (1997) (illustrating how international
criminal courts were silent during the Cold War era).
61
See Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The
Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 203, 218 (1998).
62
GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 95.
63
GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 95.
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Nuremberg trials.64 However, their creation remains a political
action, intended
to ease the world’s conscience for not intervening to
stop the atrocities in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Even some highly placed officials at the ICTY and
ICTR suspect the courts were meant as fig-leaves to
create the illusion that the international community was
doing something about these terrible conflicts, a
suspicion fuelled by the often lukewarm support of
major powers for the ad hoc tribunals.65
These factors culminated in the United Nations (UN)
Security Council’s decision to award primacy to the tribunals’
temporal and geographical jurisdictions. Article 9 of the ICTY
Statute 66 and Article 8 of the ICTR Statute 67 outline this
relationship, awarding the tribunals “primacy over national
courts.” 68 This shift away from deference to national
procedure,69 as seen in the post- World War II context, must
again be viewed through a political, as well as a moral lens.
The intersection between politics and the international
judicial process is prevalent in the formation of the ICTY and
the ICTR. With their creation predicated on the UN Security
64

Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the
Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT'L
L. 353, 382–83 (2011) (explaining that Nuremberg established the principle
of responsibility for certain violations of international law in succeeding
Yugoslavian and Rwandan International Criminal Tribunals).
65
Beth K. Dougherty, Right-Sizing International Criminal Justice:
The Hybrid Experiment at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 80 ROYAL
INST. INT’L AFF. 311, 312 (2004).
66
See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]
(stating that the International Tribunal and national courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991, and the International Tribunal shall have
primacy over national courts and may at any stage of the procedure request
national courts to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal in
accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the International Tribunal).
67
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (explaining that that although the ICTR and the
national courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the ICTR has superior authority
over national courts with respect to international humanitarian law
violations committed within the Rwandan territory).
68
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
69
See El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 883–84 (noting that in the Tadic
case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber responded to the States’ continuous
challenges to primacy by holding that the U.N. Charter fully justifies such a
policy).
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Council’s Chapter VII powers, 70 the primacy awarded to the
tribunals can be viewed as “draw[ing] lifeblood from the
political process” of the UN.71 Indicating the manner in which
the tribunals derive their authority from the structure of the UN
and its relationship with the member states:
all members of the United Nations, through a
binding treaty obligation in the form of the
Charter, agree that the Security Council “acts on
their behalf” in carrying out its responsibility to
maintain and restore international peace and
security. The Charter regime is a dominant
feature of the normative international legal
landscape, and its legal force imbues the ICTY
and ICTR with binding authority over
established state actors.72
The application of this authority in practice was beset by
problems. The UN “envisioned Nuremberg, not a pair of
tribunals whose expenses and life-spans seemed to keep
increasing.” 73 While these operational practicalities had farreaching implications for UN action in future conflicts, 74 it
remains the problematic role of the tribunals in the transitional
process that creates most concern. The failure to appreciate the
domestic impact of international prosecutions is a failure to
understand that “tribunals do not operate in a vacuum, and the
ICTY and ICTR actions have clearly had an impact on the
situation on the ground in the Balkans and Rwanda.” 75 The
ICTY has been plagued by accusations that it has “reinforced
ethnic cleavages”76 and retarded the development of domestic
legal mechanisms.77 The ICTR, initially supported by Rwandan
70

U.N. Charter, Chapter VII, arts. 39–51 (establishing the Security
Council’s powers to use military or non-military force to maintain
international peace and security).
71
Newton, supra note 5, at 41 (explaining that the ICTY and the
ICTR evolved from the U.N. Security Council’s political process).
72
Id.
73
Dougherty, supra note 65, at 312.
74
See Dougherty, supra note 65, at 320 (noting that the Security
Council’s response to the conflict in Sierra Leone was largely a construct of
the failures of the ICTY/ICTR and the lack of funding provided to the
Special Court for Sierra Leone).
75
GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 102.
76
Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle
and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SEC. 5, 21
(2004) (opining that the ICTY has supported actions motivated by ethnic
considerations); Olivera Simic, Brining “Justice” Home? Bosnians, War
Criminals and the Interaction between the Cosmopolitan and the Local, 12
GERMAN L.J. 1388, 1407 (2011) (arguing that the ICTY supported
ethnonationalism).
77
Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 76, at 22 (2004) (stating that the
biased preferences of the ICTY has inhibited the growth of domestic law);
Varda Hussain, Sustaining Judicial Rescues: The Role of Outreach and
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officials, 78 has also faced attack for its failings. Temporal
restrictions on the ICTR’s jurisdiction, put in place to “expedite
the work of justice and the process of reconciliation,” 79 have
faced particular criticism:
Rwandan representatives have countered that
this will severely curtail [the ICTR’s] ability to
achieve
domestic
reconciliation:
“An
international tribunal which refused to consider
the causes of genocide . . . cannot be of any use
to Rwanda because it will not contribute to
eradicating the culture of impunity or creating a
climate conducive to national reconciliation.”80
Despite the internal decision to adopt the Alternative Justice
Mechanism (AJM) gacaca to impose a broader range of
accountability for the genocide and move the country towards
reconciliation, the ICTR remains a remote international
institution. 81 Deriving its power from the UN structure and
essentially the product of international political concerns
combined with a post-Cold War liberalism, “the main
beneficiary of the ICTR’s work arguably has been the
international community – whether in terms of assuaging guilt
or developing international criminal law – and not
Rwandans.”82 With the ICTY and ICTR plagued by accusations
of inadequacy, the movement away from primacy in the
creation of the ICC may represent a logical progression (or
regression) from the tribunals’ problems.

Capacity-Building Efforts in War Crime Tribunals, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 547,
562 (2005) (discussing the stagnation of domestic law brought from the
implementation of international law through the ICTY).
78
Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and
Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the
Rwandan national Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of
1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 180 (2000).
79
Martii Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 1, 10 (2002).
80
Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The
Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT’L ORG 655, 667–68 (2001)
(quoting a Rwandan representative identifying the temporal restrictions as
detracting from a climate conducive to national reconciliation).
81
See MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 130–31 (1st ed. 2007) (stating that postgenocide
Rwanda exemplifies the costs of externalized justice); see also Lillian A.
Barria & Steven D. Roper, How Effective are International Criminal
Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 349,
349 (2005) (conceding that literature has frequently identified the tribunals
as ineffective).
82
DRUMBL, supra note 81, at 132 (identifying the international
community as the primary beneficiary of the development of international
criminal courts).
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d. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court
The decision to adopt the Rome Statute on July 17,
1998, the last day of the Rome Conference, was hailed by
advocates “as a triumph of international aspiration over the
political and pragmatic realities of the international system that
have prevented the evolution of an effective and permanent
international criminal court since the end of World War I.”83
Movement towards the creation of a permanent international
court was indeed a long and drawn-out process, dominated by
debates regarding the relationship between national and
international criminal jurisdictions.84
The earliest debates regarding complementarity are
found at the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907.85 This
meeting was an attempt to remedy the failings of 1899’s First
Conference, at which the Permanent Court of Arbitration was
established.86 Specifically, “it was hoped that the failure of the
First Conference to give the Court of Arbitration compulsory
jurisdiction could be corrected and a functional permanent
tribunal could be established.”87 These efforts, predating the
Rome Conference by almost a century, were stymied by
political concerns. 88 The initially supportive American
delegation eventually rejected the notion of compulsory
jurisdiction.
[T]he rhetoric designed to rally support for an effective
court was little more than empty rhetoric. Instead of
submitting to compulsory jurisdiction of the proposed
Court, the Americans submitted a long list of
reservations to jurisdiction based upon a desire to
protect America’s “vital interests.” This sentiment in
support of state sovereignty was echoed throughout the
Conference, and only two of the forty four nations

83

Newton, supra note 5, at 23.
See generally U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25 (discussing
the hurdles in establishing an international court).
85
PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp? pag_id=1044 (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (stating
that the PCA was established at The Hague in 1899 and revised at the
second Hague Peace Conference in 1907).
86
Peter, supra note 38, at 180.
87
K. Hubbard Heid, Separation of Powers Within the United
Nations: A Revised Role for the International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 165, 171 (1985).
84
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present were willing to accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court.89
However, the question of a permanent international court did
not end with the Second Hague Peace Conference. The horrors
of World War I ensured that numerous efforts were made to
raise the debate throughout the inter-war period. 90 With little
international legal foundation, the issue of complementarity
and jurisdiction was sidelined in favor of discussions relating to
the Court’s proposed legal basis. 91 It was with the violations
committed in World War II that a new urgency seized the
debate and the question of complementarity was reintroduced.92 The London International Assembly, “created in
1941 under the auspices of the League of Nations Union, was
not an official body but its members were designated by the
Allied Governments established in London” 93 The Assembly
debated the question of Nazi war crimes prosecutions, with
specific focus on the jurisdictions available to conduct trials,
and drew the conclusion that “as far as possible, national courts
should deal with all war crimes which came within their
respective jurisdictions, but that certain categories of war
crimes . . . should be remitted to an international criminal
court.” 94 The decision to reorient the debate and consider
questions of jurisdiction mirrors the speed with which the
Allies moved towards the Nuremberg trials. Complementarity
is ultimately a functional concept. As such, the lack of
commitment to an international court during the inter-war
period negated any need to concentrate on questions of the
court’s function. Instead, the debate was one of foundations.
Following World War II, the impetus to proceed with
international trials introduced a need to ask questions of
procedure and function. It is within this context that the
complementarity principle began to dominate discussions of an
international criminal court.
The role of complementarity was a question also
considered in the codification of human rights following
88

Peter, supra note 38, at 180 (explaining why the Court of
Arbitration was not given compulsory jurisdiction).
89
Peter, supra note 38, at 180.
90
See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25 (surveying the
question of an international court’s legal basis); see also Susan Hannah
Farbstein, The Effectiveness of the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the
International Criminal Court: The Issue of Complementarity at 13–14,
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (August 2001) available at
http://www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx_lfpubdb/working_ paper_12.pdf (analyzing
the legal bases for past international tribunals).
91
See Peter, supra note 38, at 182 (adverting to the urgency
engendered by World War II vis-à-vis the need for an international criminal
court).
92
See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25.
93
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25.

54 ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 2, No. 2
& COMPARATIVE LAW

World War II. On December 11, 1946, the UN General
Assembly adopted a resolution requesting that the Economic
and Social Council (ESC) address the drafting of a Genocide
Convention. 95 Alongside substantive discussions, it was the
debate regarding the jurisdiction of a parallel international
court that most divided negotiating parties:
Those favo[]ring the granting of jurisdiction to an
international court felt that such a provision was
essential, as in almost every serious case of genocide it
would be impossible to rely on the courts of the State,
where the crime has been committed, to exercise
effective jurisdiction. The opponents contended that the
intervention of an international court would be an
infringement of State sovereignty.96
This seemingly insurmountable division was eventually
resolved as a compromise in Article VI of the Genocide
Convention which “provides that the competent courts are
those of the state on whose territory the offence is committed
or ‘an international criminal court which can dispense justice
for those states party to the convention that have recognized its
jurisdiction.’”97 This debate was mirrored in the creation of the
Anti-Apartheid Convention, which is “the only international
convention which provides for the establishment of an
international criminal court.”98 Indeed,
Article V of the Anti-Apartheid Convention kept open
the possibility that in the future, in addition to the
principle of universal criminal jurisdiction to be applied
by all states’ domestic courts, there would be an
international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes
of apartheid. In this it went further than the Convention
against Genocide, since it set universal criminal
jurisdiction and jurisdiction of an international criminal
court side by side.99
The Rome negotiations were, therefore, a culmination of a
century-long debate regarding an international criminal court
and its jurisdiction. The political nature of these discussions,
reflected most acutely in the State sovereignty and ‘vital
interest’ arguments, stymied the Court’s creation. The
complementarity debate was one that dominated the Rome
94

U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25 (explaining the main
argument for and against the creation of an international court for genocide
issues).
96
Bernard Graefrath, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and an
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97
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Graefrath, supra note 96, at 71.
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negotiations and “it was clear from the outset that widely
divergent views existed on the approach to be taken.”100 Rome
took forward the outline of the International Law
Commission’s (ILC) 1993 Draft Statute, initially criticized as
too vague. 101 The ILC approach centered on judging
complementarity, and invoking international jurisdiction,
according to the unavailability or ineffectiveness of national
courts. 102 Despite objections relating to the subjectivity of
determining ‘unavailability’ or ‘ineffectiveness,’ this outline
for the complementarity doctrine was one ultimately applied by
the Rome Statute.103
The decision to include a principle of complementarity
in the ICC’s foundational statute was an attempt to resolve a
long history of disputes regarding the Court’s jurisdiction. It
was a compromise aimed “to safeguard the primacy of national
jurisdictions, but also to avoid the jurisdiction of the court
becoming merely residual to national jurisdiction.” 104 While
the Statute itself does not offer an explicit definition of
complementarity, provisions outlined in both the Preamble105
and Article 1106 “compels the conclusion that the International
99

Graefrath, supra note 96, at 71.
ROY S. LEE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 45 (1st ed. 1999).
101
See LEE, supra note 100, at 45 (explaining the ILC’s main
points and the rationale behind them).
102
See LEE, supra note 100, at 45–51 (detailing the resistance of
some delegations to aspects of complementarity and the eventual
compromise); see also NIDAL NABIL JURDI, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS: A CONTENTIOUS RELATIONSHIP 16 (2011)
(stating that complementarity was chosen over primacy, an alternative legal
theory).
103
See Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A
New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 869, 890 (2001–2002) (suggesting that states would be reluctant to
sign the ICC without this balancing approach); see also Bartram S. Brown,
Primacy or Complimentarity, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 418 (1998)
(describing how complementarity and some other key issues would
determine the balance of power between the international and national
courts).
104
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Criminal Court,1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/22; GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 20
(1995). In paragraph 10 of the Preamble, it is asserted that “the
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
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Int’l. Crim. Ct., Preamble.
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In paragraph 10 of the Preamble, it is asserted that “the International
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions.” See Rome Stat. of the Int’l. Crim. Ct.,
Preamble.
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Article 1, in language mirroring paragraph 10 of the Preamble,
states that the ICC “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
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Criminal Court was intended to supplement the foundation of
domestic punishment for violations of international norms,
rather than supplant domestic prosecutions.” 107 The Statute’s
attempt to address the relationship between the jurisdiction of
the Court and the State therefore envisions a complementary
relationship between the two.
Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute detail the
specifics of the ICC’s complementarity doctrine.108 Under the
banner of determining the “admissibility” of a case for
investigation and prosecution by the Court, Article 17
“establish[es] the critical bulwark that protecting the power of
sovereign states to prosecute cases in their national courts, as
opposed to relying on the ICC.” 109 Article 17(1)(a) provides
that a case being investigated within a national jurisdiction
shall be deemed inadmissible “unless the State is unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution.”110 The language used in this Article, specifically
the words ‘unwillingness,’ ‘inability,’ and ‘genuine,’ has been
the subject of extensive academic debate.111
Mirroring the objections at Rome, critics in academia
have viewed the terms as vague and subjective.112 There is an
in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, Jul.
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
106
See El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 896 (explaining that the ICC
Statute makes it clear that the goal of the ICC is to support and enhance the
prosecution of international crimes rather than take jurisdiction away from
any nations involved).
107
Michael A. Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We
Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 115, 115
(2010).
108
El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 898 (noting that the admissibility
criteria established by Article 17 shelters the jurisdiction of sovereign states
to prosecute their own cases).
109
Newton, supra note 5, at 47-48.
110
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, ¶ 1,
Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
111
See Greenawalt, supra note 7 (discussing the various
interpretations surrounding the language of Article 17); see also BurkeWhite, supra note 21, at 87–91 (analyzing the Democratic Republic of
Congo, specifically the question of whether a blanket amnesty constitutes an
unwillingness to prosecute); see also Jennifer J. Llewellyn, A Comment on
the Complementary Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court:
Adding Insult to Injury in Transitional Contexts?, 24 DALHOUSIE L. J. 192,
198–200 (2001) (giving an analysis of the ability of Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions to meet the complementarity criteria); see also
Jann Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation
of Substantive Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 87 (2003)
(interpreting the language of the statute).
112
Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National
Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 86, 87 (2003) (noting that “unwillingness” and “inability” both
involve a subjective assessment of a State’s motives and decisions).
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explicit difficulty in understanding how exactly the ICC might
determine a State as proving unwilling, unable, or not genuine;
Articles 17(2) and 17(3) were intended to eliminate this
problem in detailing the criteria by which a State should be
judged,113 but substantial difficulty remains in conducting such
appraisals. 114 Making determinations in accordance with the
Rome Statute’s complementarity criteria is inherently
“complex and often call[s] for difficult subjective assessments
by the court and prosecutor.” 115 This suggests that the
introduction of specific criteria relating to unwillingness or
inability has failed to solve the crisis of objectivity facing the
ICC’s complementarity doctrine.
Despite these allegations of subjectivity, the Rome
Statute represents a landmark attempt to codify and legalize its
conception of the complementarity doctrine.116 Fundamentally
at issue, however, is the manner in which the legalization of
complementarity misrepresents this historically political
concept. The introduction of admissibility criteria substantially
reduces the judicial picture and restricts the responsiveness of
complementarity to domestic context. 117 The historical
fluctuations of the complementarity doctrine indicate that the
principle has been traditionally context-dependent. It has been
manipulated and adapted according to the political demands of
each situation and has been subject to the whims of the
political powers. Studying how complementarity has altered
over the decades, it is arguable that the concept has manifested
a two-level political responsiveness. The first, a reflection of
the global balance of power and the demands of a stable world

113
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114
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Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 86 (2003); see also Llewellyn, supra note 111 at 192.
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El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 969 (describing the history of the
complementarity doctrine and commending the Rome Statute’s success
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Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court:
an Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 385 (2000) (recognizing the Rome
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order, the second, an acknowledgement of the domestic
political context towards which the judicial process is directed.
II.

THE
POLITICS
COMPLEMENTARITY

OF

An examination of complementarity’s historical
trajectory has revealed flexibility in both its application and
form of outcomes. The conclusion that this flexibility results
from political responsiveness suggests that complementarity’s
historically manipulable nature reflects the fluidity of
international and domestic politics. Stemming from this
understanding is the formulation of a two-level model of
political responsiveness. This section will lay out the
fundamentals of this model and suggest that a reintroduction of
the political is necessary in order to offer victims true redress
following instances of crisis and conflict.
a. The Two-Level Model of Political Responsiveness
To suggest that complementarity exhibits the
characteristics of a mere political doctrine fails to consider the
nature of the interaction between political forces and the
judicial process. The historical analysis of complementarity,
while not comprehensive, offers two examples of the political
and judicial relationship on international and domestic levels.
i.

The International Level

Complementarity’s responsiveness to international
political factors reflects its manipulation by global powers,
according to their interests and the demands of maintaining a
stable international order. The post-World War I debate
illustrated the tensions inherent in navigating the terrain of war
crimes trials under the pressures of international politics. The
initial advocacy of international tribunals to deter the waging
of aggressive war and associated costs to victim states was a
manifestation of self-interest and fear for the future of
international peace and security. 118 It was an overwhelming
concern for global stability that won out and the subsequent
shift in favor of domestic trials was intended to stave off
Germany’s potential collapse.119 While it would be inaccurate
to suggest that international political forces offer exclusive
118

BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 4 (2d ed. 2010) (asserting that
prosecution of international crimes is the best way to promote desirable
substantive norms and societal outcomes); WILLIS, supra note 24
(discussing the Prime Minister’s wishes to set a new legal precedent of
holding leaders criminally responsible for leading wars of aggression).
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explanation for the outcome of complementarity debates
following World War I, the importance of these considerations
must not be downplayed.
When viewed in line with the discussions that preceded
the Nuremberg trials, a consistent pattern of international
political responsiveness emerges. Similar to the reasoning
behind the post-World War I debates, the Allies’ dominant
concern was the deterrence of future aggressive acts and the
accompanying drain on resources.120 The priority assigned to
these interests was nowhere better stated than in Justice
Jackson’s opening address at the Nuremberg trials:
In the United States, we have tried to build an economy
without armament, a system of government without
militarism, and a society where men are not regimented
for war. This purpose, we know now, can never be
realized if the world periodically is to be embroiled in
war. The United States cannot, generation after
generation, throw its youth or its resources on to the
battlefields of Europe to redress the lack of balance
between Germany’s strength and that of her enemies,
and to keep the battles from our shores.121
As this statement indicates, beyond the projection of power
interests the Nuremberg trials also represented a culmination of
concern for a stable post-conflict Europe. Integral to this
conclusion was the belief that the judicial process must be one
aspect of a larger attempt to move Germany away from
Fascism and the Nazi legacy. 122 Morgenthau’s pastoralization
plan was a victim of these priorities, with the public and,
subsequently, the administration believing that it would
exacerbate tensions and increase the chances of a Nazi
resurgence. 123 The view that international prosecution of the
top Nazi leaders would consolidate denazification and
contribute to a stable European future was therefore a major
factor in the journey towards Nuremberg.
Preceding the surge of internationalism that
accompanied the ICTY and ICTR, the international politics of
120

See WILLIS, supra note 24, at 80 (showing the reasoning behind
the post-World War I debates of deterring future aggressive acts).
121
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Military (U.S. v. Göring) 98–155 (Nuremberg: Int’l Mil. Trib. 1947)
(emphasis added).
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Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 411 (stating that some of the
broader implications of the Nuremberg trials were those of reparations,
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Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 418 (explaining how the
Morgenthau plan fell out of favor once American newspapers proposed that
it was reinvigorating the German war effort).

60 ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 2, No. 2
& COMPARATIVE LAW

the Cold War forced a turn to domestic jurisdictions for human
rights trials. 124 The international standoff between America
and Soviet Russia forced the growth of international criminal
justice to take a back seat; the maintenance of a delicate
diplomatic balance took precedence, 125 further demonstrating
the susceptibility of complementarity to the whims of the
political. The end of the Cold War and subsequent creation of
the ICTY and ICTR confirms the trend. As described in
Section II, the tribunals emerged from the political decisionmaking process of the UN and the interests of the five
permanent members of the Security Council.126 They were also,
in part, the result of collective guilt at earlier international
inaction. 127 The tribunals, derived from the UN’s political
structure and interests,128 are an unequivocal demonstration of
the manner in which the political shapes the application of
complementarity.
A consideration of these key moments in the history of
international criminal justice effectively substantiates
complementarity’s international political responsiveness.
Complementarity, as traditionally applied, has been subject to
the whims of the global powers, both in terms of a desire to
further their own domestic interests and an obligation to
preserve stability in the international order.
ii.

The Domestic Level

Complementarity can also be viewed as historically
responsive to the domestic political context. 129 While the
complementarity debates that followed World War I were
dominated by the interests of the victors, there was also an
124
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Dougherty, supra note 65 (noting the possibility that the
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It is important to note that the term ‘domestic political context’
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of governance and party politics. Rather, the term represents the implicitly,
as well as explicitly, political, including the living situation of the citizenry,
the conduct of crisis or conflict, and the exercise of traditions (specifically
emphasizing practices relating to transition, reconciliation, and justice).
Therefore, as applied in this article ‘domestic political context’ indicates
those factors relating to governance, the relationship between citizens and
the government, and post-conflict transitional processes.
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implied concern for Germany’s internal stability. 130 Although
typically framed by a fear of how Germany’s potential
collapse would affect the international order, the discussions
looked to Germany’s domestic situation as indicative of the
form that post-conflict prosecutions should take. 131 Similarly,
the Allied decision to defer to domestic trials was largely a
consequence of extensive public and political opposition
within Germany to international war crimes tribunals. 132
Despite Leipzig’s failure in offering rigorous trials for
international crimes, the victors’ decision to defer to domestic
trials can be explained through the lens of the two-level model
of complementarity. Shaped by international political concerns
and guided by Germany’s internal instability, the Leipzig trials
were a manifestation of complementarity’s responsiveness to
the political demands placed on the Allied decision makers.
Again mirroring the trajectory of the post-World War I
debates, the Nuremberg discussions were influenced
enormously by Germany’s domestic situation. While similarly
framed by a concern for the European power balance, the
Allies’ goal of denazification was largely fed by an
understanding of the country’s post-conflict transition needs.133
Perceiving the impact of the opposing plans for Germany’s
future within the context of their potential domestic impact
was integral to the decision-making process.134 Ultimately, the
130

GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 37; MOHAMED M. EL
ZEIDY, THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICE 1718 (2008) (noting that the
deteriorated political conditions in Germany almost resulted in an overthrow
of the German government if not for the liberal interpretation of Article 228
and the application of complementarity).
131
GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 37; see also CLAUD
MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRAILS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WAR CRIMINALS
TRIALS AND A STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY 26 (1921) (explaining that
the Allies’ acceptance of a conditional arrangement for Germany to try a
selected number of cases before a German Court resulted from Germany’s
gravely unsettled political climate).
132
WILLIS, supra note 24, at 12122; ZEIDY, supra note 130, at 18
(emphasizing the public opposition of the German army to stand trial before
a foreign tribunal as incompatible with a German soldier’s honor and sense
of personal dignity).
133
JAMES MCALLISTER, NO EXIT: AMERICA AND THE GERMAN
PROBLEM, 1943-1954 50 (2002) (stressing that the U.S. State Department’s
goal of integrating a disarmed but united Germany into the world economy
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41819 (stating that public opinion in mid-1940’s America had shifted
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to destroy Germany as a political entity towards support for plans to
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See BASS, supra note 42, at 154 (noting that particular focus was
given to the educatory potential of the various plans, “Presumably the
element of the Nuremberg trials that would have most appealed to Roosevelt
was their educational value: the Germans would be fed soup and truth.”);

62 ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 2, No. 2
& COMPARATIVE LAW

form of justice applied at Nuremberg was intended as part of a
broad programme of denazification, necessary to Germany’s
transition from a fascist state.135 As such, the decision to pursue
international trials was a culmination of questions about the
structure of post-war Europe, a desire to avoid the costs of
total war, and an understanding of Germany’s need to escape
the clutches of a pervasive Nazi legacy.
The final historical snapshot is that of the ICTY and
ICTR. As previously discussed, their formation was
fundamentally a product of the UN’s political process.136 The
unique nature of the humanitarian crises in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda were major factors in the decision to form the
tribunals; the application of primacy may in part be explained
as deriving from the character of the “disturbing situation[s]”
that emerged in these countries. 137 The decision to award
primacy was also an acknowledgement of the unavailability of
comprehensive domestic judicial mechanisms.138 However, the
issues regarding transition were addressed primarily by
domestic actors. As illustrated by the Rwandan situation and
the introduction of gacaca to broaden the judicial picture, the
ICTR was viewed as largely inadequate to achieve
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accountability in post-atrocity transition. 139 While looking to
the domestic context in terms of judicial availability, there was
a failure to account for the wider political context within which
the genocide had occurred.140 As the first truly institutionalized
attempt to apply a version of the complementarity doctrine,
this limited appreciation for the domestic context can be seen
as paralleled in the legalistic conception of complementarity
laid out by the Rome Statute.141
Although drawing much of its focus from the politics
of the international realm, the formation of the ICTY and
ICTR does substantiate the two-level model of
complementarity. The tribunals should be viewed as a
stepping-stone from an application of the concept that is more
fully embedded in the domestic political context – as seen in
the post-World War I and World War II debates – to the
codified and legalistic conception of the Rome Statute.
III.

CONCLUSION: A REINTRODUCTION OF THE
POLITICAL?

The Rome Statute’s pursuit of a legalistic conception of
complementarity has misunderstood the principle’s historically
political nature. This misunderstanding stems from an endemic
fear of the political and a rejection of politics as the opponent
of justice. 142 Indeed, the Court consistently advocates the
139
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social harmony rather than penalizing the guilty party).
140
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investigation until domestic jurisdictional criteria and admissibility
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complete removal of political understanding from the
international judicial process:
The message conveyed by Court’s [sic] officials is
unambiguous: it is up to the Court’s organs to stay clear
of politics, to subordinate politics to law, and to speak
law to power. Politics, in other words, is portrayed as
external to law, as something that needs to be overcome
by independent organs acting on the basis of pre-given
rules and principles. In this understanding the Court’s
fight against impunity is also a struggle with, or even
against, politics.143
The rejection of power politics and potential manipulation by
international political agendas is vital to the judicial process
and, in this sense, the ICC’s exclusion of politics from its
procedure is necessary. However, bringing forward the lessons
learned from the historical analysis, true redress for victims is
limited by a rejection of the political context on all levels. The
ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, stated in 2008
that “[a]s the Prosecutor, my duty is to apply the law without
political considerations. I cannot adjust to political
considerations.” 144 This inflexibility is problematic. In
recognising the true nature of complementarity as a doctrine of
two-level political responsiveness and pairing this
understanding with an acknowledgement of victims’ interests
as a priority, the ICC’s attitude is in dire need of reform. The
removal of power politics from the application of
complementarity is paramount – to subject the transitional
process to the manipulation of self-interested international
powers is a failure to prioritize the victims of atrocity. However,
there must be an emphasis placed on the acknowledgement and
understanding of the domestic political context. As
demonstrated through the situation facing Uganda in its
struggle against the LRA and ICC prescriptions, a failure to
understand transitional justice as going beyond international
Rule of Law prosecutions is also a failure to put the victims at
the heart of the judicial process. The ICC’s rejection of AJMs
as falling outside of its judicial model and failing to meet the
4 (pointing to the trial of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the
Yugoslavia Tribunal as examples of instruments of truth and memory rather
than criminal law’s obsessive concentration of the accused).
143
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Rome Statute’s complementarity criteria 145 offers Ugandans
little control and stymies the transitional process. It restricts the
picture of justice to one of retributivism and individualism.146
Advocating that the ICC reintroduce the political
through an acknowledgement of domestic political context –
along the vein of post-World War I and II attempts to respond
to domestic demands – recognizes that the current legalistic
conception of complementarity is inadequate. It understands
that post-atrocity accountability and transition requires more
than a narrow vision of justice.147 A fear of the political and
belief in individual accountability for mass atrocity has
facilitated a situation in which the ICC pursues a tunnel-vision
conception of post-conflict justice and accountability. 148
History has demonstrated that complementarity is a fluid
concept, able to respond to the vacillating demands of postconflict situations. This fluidity must be reincorporated into
international practice.149
The struggle facing countries such as Uganda in
coming to terms with atrocity cannot be oversimplified.
Unfortunately, the ICC’s failure to acknowledge the
detrimental impact of its narrow conception of
complementarity and broaden the judicial picture has
exacerbated many of the problems. In moving forward, ICC
officials must understand that a conception of complementarity
that acknowledges the domestic context and reintroduces a
level of responsiveness to the political is necessary in placing
victims at the helm. If it fails to do so, the Court will continue
to find itself plagued by accusations of warped priorities and
institutional self-interest.
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